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Global Dislocations, Network Solutions 
 
March 7, 2004 
Francis Pisani1  and John Arquilla  
 
Introduction 
  Globalization is essentially an attempt to foster universal commercial, 
social and political norms of behavior in a world where diversity—in all 
areas of interaction—has always ruled.  Naturally, the great 
transformation called for by this vision of interconnectedness sparks 
tensions with existing institutions and practices.  Yet there is nothing 
predetermined about the ways in which these tensions will be played out 
in the coming years; and by understanding the causes of potential 
difficulties and considering a range of remedies, it may be possible to 
find a peaceful, progressive way forward.   
  There have been two previous visions about how to impose homogeneity 
upon the heterogeneous—both of which arose within a few years of each 
other in the mid-19th century.  The first was Britain's belief that a global 
order based upon free trade could be established.  The second attempt 
was inspired by socialist ideals of Marx and Engels, who believed 
capitalism would eventually bring together the workers of the world in 
great enough numbers to overturn the old system and install in its place a 
classless global order.   
  Both visions eventually came undone.  Uninhibited capitalism, though, 
did lead to the degree of interconnectedness that had been expected.  
Indeed, those who think the current era is unique should observe that 
economic interdependence was greater in the years before World War I 
than it is today (see Gilpin 2000, pp. 293-4).  The communitarian ideal of 
the socialists also made initial progress, but went awry as its chief 
proponents destroyed liberty in the process of trying to create a forced 
version of equality.   
  Today a third attempt to create global order is under way.  It sees in the 
efficiencies and interconnections fostered by the information revolution 
the chance to expand free markets and simultaneously to spread 
                                        
1 Francis Pisani is a Bay Area based technology correspondent for international newspapers El País 
(Spain), Le Monde (France) and Reforma (Mexico). He covers IT development in the Silicon 
Valley as well as the rest of the US. He has covered Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean 
for several European media companies between 1979 and 1996. Francis was a Nieman Fellow at 
Harvard in 1992. He has published several books related to his activities as a journalist.   John 
Arquilla is an associate professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California.  He is best known for his collaborative RAND studies with David 
Ronfeldt, notably Cyberwar is Coming! (1993), The Advent of Netwar (1996), In Athena's Camp 
(1997), and Swarming and the Future of Conflict (1999). Their latest book, Networks and 
Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (2001) analyzes the rise of terror and 
transnational criminal networks, and considers strategic options for waging the current terror war. 
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democracy.  This movement is led by the United States and Britain, 
where factions of both the right and the left—whatever other differences 
they might have—agree upon this notion of a prosperous "democratic 
peace."2  And, while both free peoples and free markets are indeed on the 
rise, so are discontent, displacement and resistance.     
  Will this latest effort to "homogenize the heterogeneous" prove 
successful?  To answer this question, we will first consider the nature 
and extent of a whole range of "dislocations" driven by current 
globalizing initiatives.  Then we will assess the prospects for existing 
state and non-state actors and institutions being able to remedy the 
situation.  Finally, we will consider a network-oriented approach to 
mitigating some of the problems caused by globalization—an approach 
that might, in the end, allow for the rise of an interconnected world that 
still retains its enormous diversity.      
            
Driving Forces Of Interconnectedness 
"Interconnectedness is a multi-edged condition." 
Two main processes can be found at the origin of globalization-related 
dislocations (GRD) that affect so many people: the opening of 
communities and territories, and homogenization. Both are directly due 
to increased interconnectedness.  
• Economic powers (corporations and states) need more openness 
and are pushing for it. They benefit most from general openness 
because of their superior ouput and their capacity to control the 
key points of the communications infrastructure.  
• Major political powers favor openness because it allows them to 
gain influence thanks to their superior output in cultural and 
symbolic flows.  
• The transnational cosmopolitan elite with shared interests favors 
interconnectedness because it gives them an important position in 
the distributed "empire." 
• Reduced costs of physical transportation and of access to 
information infrastructures contributes to an easier and increased 
interconnectedness. 
• Migration, when it gets to a significant level, pushes for more 
interconnectedness (flows of persons, goods, money, ideas, 
cultural artifacts etc.) 
• There are also several detrimental factors that may act to slow the 
process of globalization: 
                                        
2See Brown et al. (1996) and Russett (1994) for thorough discussion of the 
debates about the concept of the "democratic peace."  Kant first fielded this 
notion in his essay "Eternal Peace."    
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a. Epidemics 
b. Massive global reaction against globalization 
c. Problems in the ICT sphere (viruses, spam, excessive 
control, information overload, etc.) 
d. Massive surges in transportation costs 
e. Generalized terrorist threats 
f. Huge technology-related accidents (gene, bio, ICT related) 
g. Fear of loss of human control over technology 
 
The Condition Of Globality 
Most of us feel the impact of globalization in our daily lives. It is a very 
concrete issue with tangible aspects. It affects the food we eat (e.g., 
sushi, espresso, white rice or genetically modified corn), the media we 
read, see or use (Hollywood and the internet everywhere, and the 
"embedded" reporters for the global mass public during the war on Iraq). 
It takes us to new places that we visit, and reaches us where we take 
refuge or go to work. It puts us at the mercy of events and evolutions that 
take place far away, outside of our reach and of our understanding: the 
local politics of New Hampshire for a South Korean, or Saudi Arabian 
Wahhabite rivalries for a New Yorker.  
Globalization offers promises and threats, which both mean dislocations. 
Its very promises are always challenging, as is the uncertainty in which it 
is unfolding.  
We are going through an epochal change: we are leaving the Age of 
Modernity—with its five centuries of the vagaries of nation-states—and 
entering a Global Age where power and influence shift restlessly.   
 
Globality and globalization 
We distinguish globality from globalization (Albrow, 1997).  
• Globality indicates a condition and not a universal ideal. It implies 
a shift from time (like in "modern") to space (like in "globe") as 
the fundamental dimension (Bell, 1976, and Harvey, 1989). It 
marks the death of certitude that came with one's own unconnected 
territory. Because the places in which we live are open to an 
uncontrollable bigger whole, globality underlines fragmentation. 
We are moving into a schizophrenic geography of spaces of flows 
and spaces of places (Castells, 1996: 376 sqq).  
• Globalization marks a transition out of modernity in which time 
allowed a gratifying discourse of 'progress', of destination. It 
indicates a set of processes without necessary outcomes (Held & 
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McGrew, 1999). Open spaces imply flows, relationships and 
therefore relativity. Open spaces imply the other. They imply 
diversity.  
And still, interconnectedness in an unbalanced world allows the most 
powerful to push their products and values through the system where 
they play an homogenizing role. 




The impact of globalization can be attributed in great measure to the fact 
that four major shifts have taken place more or less at the same time. 
They affect politics, crime, markets, finance, production, migration, 
culture, and the environment, in short, most and possibly all of human 
activity:   
• The emergence of a new technology paradigm indicates a shift 
from cheap inputs of energy to cheap inputs of information 
(Freeman, 1988:10). In more concrete terms, data and knowledge 
are feeding the new machine while oil and electricity remain 
relevant but are losing some of their edge. The effect of this shift is 
pervasive because information is an integral part of all human 
activity. It works according to a network logic and is based on 
flexibility. 
• The organization of production on a global scale has been 
sought by big corporations, with increased intensity after the 1973 
Oil crisis. Different from a world economy (Braudel, 1967, 
Wallerstein, 1974), the system is characterized by its capacity to 
"work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale" (Castells, 
1996:92).  
The impact on people can be explained by the unequal access to 
technology and by the difference between firms and people. Firms 
thrive at the global level. They become networked and take 
advantage of the best conditions (labor costs, security) wherever 
they find them. Workers are not really global except for the 
cosmopolitan elite. They prefer to work close to home or may 
move to a place where part of their network has already set foot.  
The individual worker may adapt and jump into the global labor 
market. It will always be at the cost of disruptions and literal, 
physical dislocations.  
• The end of the general belief in metanarratives is the very 
definition on which postmodernism is based (Lyotard, 1979). 
Many people confront a loss of faith in progress and certainties at 
the very same moment in which they feel threatened by the 
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technological and economic shifts. In many cases this proves to be 
too much to handle.  
This point is not accepted by some analysts because, faced with 
change, uncertainty and complexity, many people turn to strong, 
reassuring and simplified answers or alternatives. A significant 
number adhere to regressive narratives and organizations that offer 
more rigidity and less individual liberties. In its own way, 
openness may be as frightening as freedom. 
The nature of identity is changing from a unified concept to one that 
includes multiple dimensions. If time, space, the condition of work and 
of consumption, the narrative that used to unite us has changed, the self 
itself is challenged. The tension between the self and the network is seen 
by some (Castells) as a key element of the new era.  
Our landmarks are displaced and our references are not any more what 
they used to be. Belonging remains important but being connected 
matters too. We like to belong to one world, so we learn to accept the 
pain that comes with being connected to multiple universes. For 
example, mestizos have a long experience and several narratives may be 
suggested from their long and painful experience of "relational identity" 
(Glissant) and "hopscotch identity" (Pisani). 
At a still deeper level, human nature itself is coming increasingly into 
question because of scientific and technological discoveries—
particularly in the field of biotechnology, which continues to intertwine 
man and machine in ways that blur the boundaries between them.   
Globalization Summarized 
The seriousness and thoroughness of globalization can be attributed to 
four major factors:  
1. It is an epochal shift pushed by the evolving needs of the economy 
that involve all human spheres of action;  
2. It happens at a time where the narratives that gave us meaning in 
the past appear not to work as efficiently;  
3. It forces us to think in a different way and invent a new complex 
thinking (with a lot of room for uncertainty); 
4. It deeply alters the modalities of our relationships with most 
everything: time, space, meaning, self and other. 
We are going through what seems the most difficult moment of this 
process. It can be defined by the fact that the old has lost much of its 
efficiency and is fading, while the new appears thus far in only a 
fragmented and immature guise. We are already in a new epoch, and yet 
we are still waiting for a new narrative to help us make sense of all this.  
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Ill-Equipped Actors  
Going through an epochal change and its multifaceted dislocations can 
only be painful, but the situation is made even worse by the fact that the 
main actors are either feeding the fire or unable to quench it.  
Corporations  
Corporations thrive on increased globalization. They may be seen as its 
main motor, but could be used to change some of its aspects. They are 
the entities which often close factories and fire workers in one area—in 
favor of other locations with lower labor costs—and who also want 
borders to be open to facilitate trade.  
Nation-States  
Nation-states work independently and put their interests first within the 
context of a world systemic structure that has been around for 350 years, 
since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648—and which has never worked 
terribly well.  
States have a local legitimacy but are generally ill equipped to solve 
interconnectedness problems. 
In the face of the kind of globalization promoted by commercial firms, 
states try to intervene and be heard. They are the depository of traditional 
political legitimacy, but they are not well suited to addressing non-
territorial issues of interconnectedness.  
Nation-states are threatened by globalization, but they try to regulate and 
organize the interconnectedness in a way that can favor them, by putting 
their interests first. Two kinds of interests tend to be involved: those of 
their constituencies (the people they represent) and those of the state 
structure itself—i.e., the state qua state.  
In the best case nation-states apply a modernist vision of what globality 
should be. They preach or work for a world government, a single market 
global culture etc. (Albrow). This drive may take the form of a mainly 
unilateral empire or hegemony, or may reflect a more multilateral 
council of nation-states. 
 
International institutions  
There are two kinds of recognized international institutions: international 
(government-based) organizations (IO) and NGOs. IOs have a global 
reach but lack a human face. They are not integrated and are inefficient. 
They are mainly accountable to nation-states.  
In recent years, NGOs have come to be recognized and accepted on the 
international scene as "non-state actors". But NGO's as they exist today 
tend to be institutions with no real organized accountability. They gain 
their efficiency from their capacity to engage in dialogue with 
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governments and corporations, yet run the risk, as they succeed, of 
distancing themselves from the real world and needs of those for whose 
benefit they have come into being. 
 
Transnational Informal Networks (TINs) 
Strangely enough (or not), a significant part of the life of this open world 
comes from a kind of organization that is very seldomly recognized: the 
transnational informal networks whose most famous examples are the 
diasporas that we find the world over. Government relationships may be 
at an all time low, markets can be hectic, yet there are always groups of 
people that manage to exchange goods and information. They are 
informal in the sense that they may have no status or elected bodies. But 
they work. One could not understand migrations without them. They beat 
border guards and they bypass financial institutions. They are effective 
because they are networks. 
 
 
Characterizing globalization-related dislocations  
Key to understanding globalization-related dislocations is that even 
successful processes often create painful problems .  
We suggest the need to distinguish between objective and subjective 
dislocations.  
Objective dislocations  create unfavorable material changes, some 
examples of which are: 
• Closing of present job opportunities 
• Applicability of non-national institutions decisions (UN, EU, right 
of intervention etc.) 
• Migration (even when it ends in an improvement of material 
situation) 
Subjective dislocations  cause psychological rather than material 
problems, such as: 
• Challenges to traditional Identity  
• Challenges to traditional authority 
• Perceived increasing inequality (it may be real too) 
• Costs of adapting to change 
• De-territorialization 
• Re-territorialization 
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Sources of dislocations  
Fragmentation - Interconnectedness implies fragmentation (plus the 
consciousness of fragmentation) and complexity. Both can be unsettling. 
Homogenization - Homogenization is a two-way street:  
• There is a dominant movement that pushes less powerful actors (in 
terms of output capacity and control of the architecture) to adopt to 
or buy the products (material or cultural) of the most powerful 
ones (the US, EU, major transnational corporations, etc.).  
• But there is a contamination/infiltration movement through which 
interconnectedness allows lesser powers to influence the bigger 
ones. The influence of Latinos in the US is a good case in point. It 
is important to realize that this contributes to dislocations of some 
sorts within the most powerful nations, especially among the less 
powerful (poor US southern whites are a case in point). 
• The homogenization that results from both movements is a hybrid 
that satisfies few people but is more of a challenge for those with 
less output and control capacity. 
Opening - The opening of the spaces we live and work in has multiple and 
partially contradictory effects: 
• Power structure - It affects the traditional local power structure 
(economic or political) and therefore is always the source of a 
conflict between those who hope to benefit from the change and 
those who fear they will lose because of it. Examples range from 
Iraq to South Africa, from Russia to Mexico. 
• Cultural values – The access to different values (democracy for 
instance) always challenges the existing ones (tribal structure for 
instance). Even when people willingly accept new values as 
"better," this is not necessarily the most common situation.  It is 
always difficult to change and adopt them in practice. 
• Opening has a complex logic of its own - In the long run, it is 
difficult to ask others to open themselves up and yet not to open 
oneself (European and US tariffs are a good example). It is 
difficult to legitimate the opening to some categories (trade for 
instance) and not to others (people), as we can see in the case of 
NAFTA.  
De-territorialization – Globalization leads to objective and subjective de-
territorializations and re-territorializations that are always challenging.   
• They can be geographical and official, like in the case of the 
European Union where the status of regions and nation-states is 
changing. Maquiladoras (with different names around the world) 
are another example. 
• They can be geographical and unofficial, like border zones whose 
inhabitants belong to several places at the same time (the nation-
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state they are in, the one on the other side of the border and the 
border zone itself). 
• They can be less literal, like in the case of migrants who live and 
work in complex, trans-local spaces. 
• They can even be totally subjective like Muslims looking at a 
Hollywood movie. 
• De-territorialization often leads to a re-territorialization effort that 
might take the form of fundamentalism or of chosen networks as 
we will show later. 
Interconnectedness in an unequal world - The complex relations 
between interconnectedness, homogenization, openness and the crisis of 
identity tend to become chaotic because of the unbalanced world we live 
in.  
• As mentioned earlier, those with higher output capacity and 
stronger control on the infrastructure have a major global impact 
that creates dislocations that are globally felt. 
• The trauma of the new masters – In most disenfranchised 
situations, openness put disenfranchised people in contact with 
new masters. It is easier to fight against the them (they have less 
allies in the place, less networks of their own) than with the old 
powers. And because of the dislocations mentioned earlier, 
opposit ion to them is a good mobilization device.  This is perhaps 
the case in Iraq, where US presence causes a disparate set of actors 
to seek a common goal. 
• The trauma of seeing the other's wealth – The communication of 
images coming from the wealthiest (because they have the major 
output), and the increased access to ICT make poor people aware 
of how the well-off live. This creates the desire to join them and 
therefore the dislocation of migration, and/or an increased 
resentment. 
• The main characteristics of the dislocations created by 
globalization is that nobody escapes them. But it is essential to 
look at them in perspective (it's better to be an American corporate 
CEO than a poor Bangladeshi peasant). Nevertheless the fact that 
everybody is affected contributes to the perception that 
globalization is bad, or at least costly. 
 
Types Of Global Dislocations  
• Power-related dislocations  are objects of control, products of 
homogenization. They generate: 
o Massive protests 
o Nationalistic reactions 
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o Social upheavals 
• Change-related dislocations  are adaptation to new influences, 
values, flows, new technologies and scientific discoveries. They 
generate: 
o Fundamentalism (Christian, Islamic and other) 
o Fear of loss of control over technology (Bill Joy, Wired, 
Apr. 2000).  
o Moral issues in front of tinkering with human nature (stem-
cell research) 
o Fear of "normal" unintended consequences 
o Fear of catastrophic intended consequences (terrorists with 
nuclear capacity) 
• Openness-related dislocations  result in de-territorialization of 
spaces and values: 
o Economic dislocations: job loss, elimination of local 
production because of cheaper products coming from the 
outside 
o Symbolic production-related dislocations: disappearance of 
local culture 
• Network-related dislocations:  
o The use of network forms of organizations by powerful 
state and non-state actors  
§ military: the US Special Forces 
§ corporations: the "global supply chain" 
o The very complex issue of the relationships between states 
and/or institutions with networks. They may fight some, 
accept some, coopt some or even create some. 
o The impact of powerful illicit networks and the "Five 
Wars" that have to be launched against them (drugs, arms 
trafficking, intellectual property, alien smuggling, money 
laundering: see Naim, Foreign Policy, 2003), in addition to 
the "war on terror" 
• Speed of change-related dislocations  
o Many changes that could be well absorbed at a proper path 
cause anxiety because of the lack of sufficient time to 
adapt.  
o These dislocations (includes timing) can be found at all 
previously mentioned levels. 
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Impact Of Emerging Technologies On Interconnectedness 
The impact of emerging technologies on global dislocations does not 
depend mainly on the technologies per se, or even on their convergence. 
Instead, the problem needs to be approached from the point of view that 
emerging technologies "gaps" might have a significant impact on 
globalization-related dislocations (GRDs).  Examples of these gaps arise 
in such areas as:  
o The ownership model and the costs it implies for a 
globalized world: open-source vs proprietary information, 
where the former is growing explosively, while the ability 
to protect intellectual property is becoming problematic. 
o Related but distinct from the first gap, there is the issue of 
architecture. It can be seen very clearly in ICT with the 
limited servers structure vs P2P arquitecture.  Here again 
the gap opens up in favor of openness and connectedness. 
o Finally there is the issue of unequal access to technology, 
what in the ICT case is generally refered to as the "digital 
divide" and should me extended to the other technologies 
we want to consider as the "emerging technologies gap (or 
divide)".  
 
Emergent Technologies--Opportunities And Challenges 
Following our analysis of globalization-related dislocations we will first 
consider known technology trends to the extent to which they contribute 
to control, homogenization, and interconnectedness.  
Communication and transportation technologies 
The spread of communication technologies and their increased reach and 
impact may be the most important single factor that contributes to 
interconnectedness. The key elements in the near future are: 
• Transportation grows ever cheaper and makes physical movements 
easier. The advent of small secure planes might contribute to a 
more distributed air transportation infrastructure.  
• Widespread cheap wireless facilities that allow circumvention of 
installation costs and connect more people in an accelerated 
process. 
• Non-traditional energy sources that allow access from remote 
places: fuel cells, solar energy and new battery technologies are 
cases in point.  
• Outsourcing technologies (e.g. videoconferencing, object faxing, 
grid computing etc.) could allow a different organization of 
production and reduce physical dislocations (migration).  
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• Moore's law will continue to bring computing power to more 
people and increase interconnectedness.   
• Metcalfe's law will reflect the power of networks growing in 
proportion to the square of the number of nodes connected 
together.   
• Reed's law that relates social networks and computer networks 
shows that when the networks include ways for individual to form 
groups its value grows exponentially. This is essential to the 
development of powerful civil society networks and smart mobs.  
• At a more distance time horizon, the possiblity to implant 
computing capacity in the human brain will have an impact on 
interconnectedness. This is particularly true of implanted 
translation devices. 
Other technologies that might have an impact on interconnectedness 
• Technologies of homogenization - They are usually refered to as 
"mass media". The issue here is a matter of output, concentration 
of ownership and control of the architecture. At this point, the 
mastery of social effects (and their cost) is giving Hollywood a 
new edge.  
• Technologies of control - Control technologies may increase the 
dislocation linked to globalization and homogenization.  
o Tiny, embedded, wireless sensors in objects and/or people 
might be used as social control devices. 
o A better understanding of networks plus ubiquitous 
computing and wireless capabilities will trigger small 
worlds/fast communications networks strategies linking, for 
example local agencies and intelligence functions. It could 
be used to try to use civil society networks for security or 
intelligence tasks. 
o Control may be resisted at all levels, in particular if the 
control comes or is perceived as coming from afar. The 
European reactions against Echelon and other forms of 
intrusive monitoring of communications are a good 
example of the sensibility to this kind of problems. TIAS or 
any system coming from this kind of effort (the program 
goes on under another name) might trigger similar 
reactions.  
• Robotics - The development of robotics will have an impact on 
jobs that are a key element of GRDs. 
• Nanotechnology and biotechnology – Advances in nanoscale 
technologies maybe the clearest example of the real challenges 
emerging technologies face when considered from the GRD 
perspective. Their promises are huge in terms of "improving 
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human health and physical capabilities", "enhancing group and 
societal outcomes", or "unifying science and education" as 
reported in the NSF document on Converging Technologies for 
Improving Human Performance. The question is how they will be 
used. This will be addressed in the following section. 
 
Control Through The Emerging Technologies Gap 
"The Human Report 2001, published by the United Nations 
Development Program, introduced a new index, the technology 
achievement intex (TAI). There are other measures for national 
technological progress in the literature. Other sections of this 
report elaborate on the Networked Readiness Index. The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 has created indexes to 
measure technology development. Regardless of which index or 
measure is used, one fact stands out: there are large differences 
in the scores achieved by the richer, more developed nations and 
those of the poorer, developing nations. The gaps exist along 
virtually all dimensions used to construct the various indexes." 
The Global Information Technology Report 2001-2002 – 
Readiness for the Networked World – World Economic 
Forum 
 
There is a difference between control through technology, or more 
precisely, through access to technology, and technologies of control 
mentioned earlier.  
We refer in this case to models of ownership and architecture issues. 
More important than the emerging technologies are the issues of the 
ownership model.  The architecture of and access to IT resources and 
fluency of users of such technology will have a considerable impact on 
globalization related dislocations. 
 
Information overload and data mining 
Paradoxically, information overload might be more of a problem for the 
less connected, because they don't have access to the tools that allow to 
make sense out of the available data and information.  
The importance of data mining and the amount of money invested by 
DARPA and US intelligence agencies in this field (e.g. InQtel) may 
increase the capacity of the powerful to make sense out of huge amount 
of data in which all the others will be lost. It might prove, in certain 
circumstances, a decisive advantage.  
Learning 
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Significant advances are foreseen in cognitive science that may impact the 
way we learn.  
If the use of these discoveries is limited to the powerful it will increase the 
technologies gap. A balanced distribution, on the countrary might 
contribute to reducing it. 
The challenge will move from an "access gap" to a "fluency gap." 
However, networking may "plug" both types of gap, by breaking down 
barriers to access, and by diffusing advanced educational and operational 
techniques.   
 
In sum, globalization has brought with it myriad levels and types of 
dislocations.  Almost all of them are disruptive, some of them pose the 
prospect of global- level disaster.  And, where the existing nation-state 
system seems only likely to exacerbate these many problems, there may 
be some hope to be found in the rise of networks. 
 
Network Solutions  
In the 1920s and 1930s, networks were defined principally in terms of 
telephony—i.e., a network was any way a system was wired.  In the 
1940s and 1950s, cultural anthropologists added the notion of the social 
network—described in terms of anybody with whom one talked.  Then in 
the 1960s and 1970s, business scholars and practitioners became much 
more specific, identifying the three fundamental topologies upon which 
networks may be built:  the chain, the hub-and-spokes design, and the 
area of all-channel interconnection.  In the 1980s and 1990s, all of these 
notions of networking came to life with the rise of the Internet and the 
Worldwide Web, and soon began to have overarching effects upon the 
commercial sector, as well as upon society in general.  We want to 
explore whether the various "dislocations" that we identified in the 
previous section might be mitigated by network-based solutions. 
But first it is important to note that contending networks seem already 
engaged in a globalization-related struggle.  On one side, developed 
countries and the social and commercial non-state actors aligned with 
them have created what Hardt and Negri (2000) see as a truly networked 
global empire with "no territorial center of power," relying instead on 
what they call "modulating networks of command" (pp. xii-xiii).  This 
imperial network enjoys media and financial control, as well as 
unsurpassed coercive military and economic power.   
This is the empire of Murdoch-type media moguls, of the U.S. military 
and the tributary states that fall in line with it, and of the multi-national 
commercial firms that drive the global economy to suit their preferences.  
All of these aspects of the imperial network are inter-related.  For 
example, 25 years ago, President Carter elucidated a doctrine that called 
for the use of force to ensure flows of Persian Gulf oil to the US.  Then, 
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a decade later, the first President Bush unleashed both military and 
media forces to re-establish this control—once it had been disturbed by 
the invasion of Kuwait—and to persuade the world of the justice of the 
cause.    
 
To oppose this new empire, Hardt and Negri borrow from Marx the notion 
that increased interconnection will itself bring together large enough 
masses to offset and ultimately roll back the empire.  Danaher and Mark 
(2003) concur with them, offering some evidence that civil society is 
already reining in the emerging global empire, principally through 
divestiture, selective purchasing and other, mostly economic, means.   
In addition to the social networks struggling against any sort of globalized 
system, terrorists and other militants have also been building networks, 
the best-known of which is of course al Qaeda.  But basically all violent 
resistance groups that are showing any signs of vibrancy are 
networked—ever more in terms of all-channel connectivity, a step 
beyond al Qaeda's initial reliance on hub-and-spokes organizational 
designs (on this point, see Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, 2003).  
As we survey a global landscape increasingly bedeviled by network-style 
conflicts (that is, "netwars"), we accept the ability of those who hold 
most power—states and large commercial firms—to network quite 
skillfully.  Unfortunately, the kind of networking in which they engage 
only seems to exacerbate the "dislocations" described in the preceding 
sections.  The same is true for terrorist and much other militant 
networking which, from the Battle of Seattle to the Bali bombing and 
beyond, only harden the resolve of the powerful and alienate the 
affections of the weak in whose name they fight.  It is clear that the 
network is a tool, like any other, and may be used for good or ill.   
Our hope and our goal is to see networking used in far more positive 
ways, ways that reduce the dislocations wrought by globalization.  Ways 
that empower without threat.  Ways that inform and transform.  And 
finally ways that are both easy to teach and to emulate.   
Hardt and Negri have it at least partly right.  The vast expansion of 
interconnectivity is wiring together the people of the world—not just 
governments or manufacturing, trading and other types of firms, but the 
masses themselves.  Along with the spread of democratic processes, 
which usually acts to guarantee free speech and other basic human rights, 
this new connectivity implies the rise of a highly networked global civil 
society that could never have been possible in any other period of 
history.  This is the realization of Teilhard's (1955, 1959) vision of a 
"noosphere," or realm of the mind.  It will also enable the shift from 
military-oriented realpolitik to an ethics-based noopolitik (see Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt 1999).3 
                                        
3  The Greek root for these terms is "noos" (the mind).   
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In practical terms, then, the goal must be to keep expanding the noosphere, 
increasingly linking peoples together at every opportunity.  Once this is 
done, the practice of noopolitik is going to commence naturally.  An 
example of this was seen in the months leading up to the U.S.- led 
invasion of Iraq, during which worldwide civil society raised a chorus of 
voices in opposition—almost preventing, but surely greatly delaying the 
attack.  And the statist triumph over the anti-war activists was Pyrrhic, as 
any new effort to take the "war on terror" to yet another country will 
almost surely founder at this point against the resistance of civil society 
actors determined to keep the peace. 
But if a nascent global civil society is to have a truly transformational 
impact on world politics, it must not ignore the possibility that nation-
states can be useful network members as well.  Indeed, the state remains 
an efficient organizing principle, focus of loyalty, and repository of 
power—of all types.  Therefore, the most important "pressure points" 
that networks face are in their relations with nations.  If they learn to 
form "deep coalitions" (term from Toffler and Toffler 1997, pp. xix-xx) 
with states—and if nations are open-minded about reaching out to 
networks—then there will be a remarkable "quickening" in the pace of 
network development.   
Sadly, some of the clearest cases of nation-network cooperation come 
from the realms of terror and crime.  For example, Iran's longstanding 
support for Hezbollah has proven spectacularly successful, with the 
terror network actually driving the Israelis out of southern Lebanon.   
With regard to other illicit activities, there seem to be a variety of crime 
networks operating in conjunction with tacit—and sometimes more 
open—state support.  Most of the criminal network-nation connections 
that exist today seem to emanate from the traffic in drugs and light 
weapons (see Williams 1994).   
But this is a phenomenon that is hardly new.  Indeed, state- level links to 
crime have been around at least since the days of the Barbary Pirates of 
North Africa about two centuries ago.  Profits from their activities had to 
be shared with the Sublime Porte in Turkey.  Their depredations were 
overlooked by the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars, as piratical 
attacks on shipping had the benefit of driving cargo shippers to find 
haven under the British flag (Whipple 1991). 
In the civil society realm it is very hard to find similar examples of nation-
network cooperation, as there is less apparent "profit" in such linkages.  
States can only see their sovereignty being undermined, and networks 
have to worry about being "captured" by a particular state interest or 
agenda.  This tension between nation and network is thus the key 
pressure point with which actors of both types have to grapple.  For the 
present it seems clear that nations will continue to "stiff arm" networks, 
and networks will remain wary of nations, seeking instead to find their 
way ahead independently.        
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Given these concerns, it may prove that the most influential networks will 
learn to transect many states—lessening their control—many inter-
governmental organizations, many social networks, and many non-state 
civil and uncivil organizations/sectors/individuals.  Indeed, individuals 
may find that they are sometimes living many lives at once as they fulfill 
their many different network roles).    
This concept of "transection" is fairly neatly captured by the concept of 
"global public policy" networks; but the fluid reality of such self-
organizing networks, whose members may exit as easily as they join, is 
that they may have difficulty actualizing their power potential.   
Nevertheless, there are thousands of these multi-dimensional, polyglot and 
interwoven networks competing and cooperating as they create the 
emerging web of global civil society.  Global insurgent networks are part 
of this—to be sure the best-known part today, given the direct threats 
they pose to the nation-state system.  But insurgency is only a small part 
of the overall network phenomenon.   The more constructive work being 
done to overcome the crises of identity arising from globalization's 
dislocations is being undertaken—with increasing success—by civil, 
rather than "uncivil," networks.   
 
Corporate Social Responsibility Networks 
The heterogeneity of these civil networks is impressive. Some, like NGOs, 
and advocacy networks are fairly known and studied, but new forms of 
network enterprises (Castells) are much less well understood. Some of 
them are even the cause of major globalization-related disruptions that 
this essay addresses (just as there are many uncivil networks, and states); 
but others participate meaningfully in those polyglot networks that are 
forming the fabric of an emerging global civil society.  
As one among many possible examples, we could mention the work done 
in the field of education and information technology by Schlumberger. 
This global oil servicing company currently has a connectivity program 
(SEED: http://www.seed.slb.com/) in over 30 countries. Moreover, in 
cooperation with "The Future of Learning" program of the MediaLab at 
MIT, it has recently launched a training program that aims at changing 
the way we learn through helping people with the use of computers, and 
the internet. 
It is our view that the network form of organization allows civil society 
organizations (CSO) to better monitor corporations in their distributed 
activities all over the world. Networked corporations, on the other hand, 
are in a better position to understand global problems even when they 
sometimes cause them. This converging evolution leads some to adopt 
the path of more corporate social responsibility. If we add to the mix, as 
the real world does, the greater recognition of the role of non-state actors 
by states themselves, international organizations and transnational 
corporations, we can see the emergence of a kind of global public policy 
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(Reinicke) and what some have begun to call global civil society 
(Keane).  
 
Global Public Policy Networks 
There is growing cooperation between public institutions (governments 
and international organizations), private corporations, and civil society 
organizations. This can be attributed to the increased influence of civil 
society, but could also be linked to the fact that its networked form of 
organization allows them to better understand problems that lie beyond 
traditional intellectual constructs and bureaucratic borders (Reinicke). 
The importance of these "trisectoral networks" is now fully acknowledged 
by the United Nations. And a report (Critical Choices, Reinicke, and 
Deng, editors) published on the subject in the year 2000 attributes their 
impact to their capacity to link together institutions and individuals from 
different countries and from diverse sectors of activity. They have 
proven to have a priceless capacity to bring together opposing groups to 
discuss common problems that no one of them can resolve by itself, and 
to gather the necessary resources to tackle them. 
Their networked nature and rather smart and inventive use of information 
technologies allow them to be quite effective in placing new issues on 
the global agenda, facilitating the negotiating of global standards, 
gathering and disseminating knowledge, and even shoring up failing 
markets. More important still, they work as bridges to bring more people 
and institutions to participate in addressing some of the main problems 
of our times. The World Commission on Dams, for example, organized 
regional hearings and case studies on dam construction in the process of 
setting standards for large-dam construction in a way "that may well be 
replicated in other public-policy domains." (Reinicke et al., p. 63) 
GPPN are a very good example of global networks' capacity to respond to 
unusual problems or to face two or three issues in different places at the 
same time. Being much more versatile than bureaucracies, these "issue-
based alliances" (Reinicke et al.) can contribute significantly to raising 
global awareness of transnational problems and marshalling the 
resources necessary to address them. 
Still, one might argue that if trisectoral GPPN have proven to be a new 
kind of effective international actor, they also tend to be --by their very 
nature-- a new kind of institution that is often too formal and structured 
to really transmit the pulse of our changing world. Reinicke and the 
authors of the report published in the framework of the UN Vision 
Project on Public Policy Networks invite GPPN actors to maintain the 
"structure" in the "structured informality" that characterizes networks. 
By so doing they contribute to strengthening their natural evolution in 
which after taking advantage of their initial fluidity these GPPN tend to 
get institutionalized, but in the process lose some of the agility that made 
them so useful. 
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This raises one of the most significant issues about networks. They 
certainly are a tool for participation and can be used by hierarchies as 
well, to increase their flexibility and their reach. On the other hand, 
informal networks are a powerful way to bring people together in a 
loose, and therefore acceptable (to all) manner, in order to achieve a goal 
on which they agree, even if just temporarily. It is our view that 
informality is a key element in what allows networks to bridge the 
"participatory gap" mentioned in the UN report. 
Some examples (from Reinicke et al.): 
General GPPN sites: 
• Global Policy Forum: http://www.globalpolicy.org/  
• Global Public Policy Institute: http://www.globalpublicpolicy.net/  
Placing new issues on the global agenda: 
• International Campaign to Ban Land Mines: http://www.icbl.org/  
Negotiating of global standards:  
• The World Commission on Dams: http://www.dams.org/  
• International Labor Rights fund: http://www.laborrights.org/   
Gathering and disseminating knowledge: 
• The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research: 
http://www.cgiar.org/  
• The Roll Back Malaria Initiative: http://rbm.who.int  
Shoring up failing markets: 
• The Urban Management Programme: 
http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/urban/Default.htm  
• Consultative Group to Assist the Poor: http://www.cgap.org/  
 Implementing ideas and decisions: 
• The Global Environment Facility: http://www.gefweb.org  
 
 
Global Civil Society 
Most of the real work being done to overcome the crisis of identity arising 
from globalization's discontents/dislocations is not the result of 
insurgency or in response to insurgency, but the 
constructive/reconstructive work being done by all the other networks 
helping to form global civil society. One of the key issues is to determine 
under which conditions GCS could play a greater positive role in the 
solution of global problems.  
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The existence and expansion of the ne tworking phenomenon seems 
indisputable, but it raises a number of issues that one needs to 
acknowledge: 
• Definition - There is a problem of definition and of history. John 
Keane, one of the most noted scholars of global civil society, 
emphasizes the fact that it has "blurred edges." He defines GCS with 
the following characteristics: non-governmental, connecting 
individuals and groups that are "interrelated and functionally 
interdependent," respect for others and admiration of the peaceful, 
pluralistic, and heterogeneous to the point of harboring strong 
conflict potential; and finally it is global which means that all the 
interactions are stretched across vast distances and many borders. 
GCS can be visualized as a social construct that spans the world, not 
unlike a dynamic biosphere of nested systems within nested systems 
as described in certain versions of complexity theory. This is a 
fascinating intellectual and theoretical challenge. But the problem 
remains that the term global civil society might be seen as describing 
both everything and nothing. 
• Heterogeneity – If such a thing as GCS exists or if it proves to be a 
useful concept (even with the problems that its definition raises), one 
cannot ignore the fact that it is inherently heterogeneous, and this can 
be seen in the way its elements are constituted. They come not only 
from civic initiatives in reaction to market forces, and private as well 
as public institutions, but are often created by government and 
corporations.  GCS is made of bridges between people and networks, 
and can be seen as a dynamic set of bridges with existing institutions 
(private or public) and markets. 
• Span - The extent (and history) of GCS is a subject of discussion. 
For some (e.g., the London School of Economics) one of its 
characteristic features is its high concentration in Western Europe 
(particularly in Scandinavia, the Benelux countries, and the UK). Yet 
the assumption of a European or western special case or vanguard 
role in the revival of the term civil society would be incorrect. Civil 
society is a global term. What's more it appeared in many different 
cultures (India, the Muslim world and Latin America at least) 
without any obvious European connection.  
• Autonomy - One of the key challenges of GCS is that it does not 
receive orders; it cannot be directed, and not even produced "like 
pizzas and fast foods, or like automobiles or microchips, or assembly 
lines. It takes time to grow," (Keane). On one hand, he argues that it 
works as a "society of societies" with rules and norms of conduct.  
On the other it is very much an evolving, open-ended process whose 
importance will depend on its ability to become more democratic, 
better integrated into governance institutions, and invested with 
universal values. The reality of autonomy and the challenges it poses 
to traditional political thinking is key when addressing global 
problem solving strategies—in as much as it means that participation 
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of GCS cannot be taken for granted. One will certainly find 
supporters and adversaries too, on any given issue. Their 
participation in one direction or another is never guaranteed, and 
neither ones are definitive.Last sentence here makes no sense to me.  
Clarify.  
In brief, global civil society, with all the problem it raises, and all its 
"blurriness," can certainly be seen as a space in which interconnected 
people, networks and more or less formal institutions work at solving 
problems, some of them global. GCS networks can play a very active, 
and at times decisive role, but those people and institutions that want to 
work with them should know that it would be illusory and 
counterproductive (if ever possible) to rely on using them in a controlled 
manner. People or institutions with a clear project will always be able to 
find one or several given networks tha t may play a role that fits their 
plans, and some types might have more potential than others, but no 
single characterization can be a guide to strategy and action.  
It is insufficient just to think in terms of the type of network with which to 
work.  What also needs to be considered is the type of interactivity that 
will work in a given situation. This will always be the principal 
challenge for those searching to establish such networked relationships, 
and there will never be hard and fast rules. 
Dealing with constructive civil society networks  
Identifying which of the "constructive" civil society networks and agendas 
are most security-constructing relative to constraining violent states on 
the one hand, and overcoming the generative conditions for dislocations, 
upheavals, and regressive/reactionary responses on the other is an 
important next step.  
Parallel to any effort centered on identifying the nature of the other, we 
argue for an approach centered on the nature of the relationship. Instead 
of a subject-centered approach to politics, what is needed is a "politics of 
relation" (Glissant, Wilson Harris). The challenge here being that it 
implies necessary changes on the part of the interested institutions. 
This is not the place to develop such a theory, but it seems obvious that 
such an approach implies developing a better understanding of autonomy 
and establishing which characteristics of civil society networks tend to 
produce a richer cooperation for a set of given goals. Besides subscribing 
to positive objectives they have to show a coherent practice. This raises 
the key question of accountability (transparency and trust according to 
the principles in the Global Knowledge Partnership). 
Further along the line, this approach implies that there are very few 
inherently bad or good civil society organizations. However, it might be 
possible to work with most through an open-minded approach based on 
the following principles: 1) It is possible to establish a set of parameters 
that should work as indicators, and no t as rules of behavior; 2) The 
agenda of those entities matter less than the way they operate; and 3) 
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Dealing with CSO is always a "two-way street" in the sense in which it 
implies respect for autonomy and challenges the way hierarchies deal 
with networked organizations. 
GCS constitutes a fast growing "third sector" accountable to itself and 
independent from governments on the one hand, and corporations/the 
market, on the other. One of the main challenges for established 
institutions is that while it is unruly from the perspective of status-quo, 
many of its networks are on the forefront of responding to multiplying 
global dislocations. 
Examples 
Oxfam: http://www.oxfam.org.uk/  
Oneworld: http://www.oneworld.net   
Opendemocracy: http://www.opendemocracy.net  
Union of International Associations: http://www.uia.org  
Friends of the Earth: http://www.foei.org/  
Climate Action Network: http://www.climatenetwork.org/  
 
If civil society networks contribute significantly to confronting many of 
today's world problems, one can never forget that global uncivil 
networks constitute serious threats to peace and security, and contribute 
to real and perceived GRDs. It is our view that translocal civic networks 
may play a key role in the construction of new kinds of secure and 
peaceful communities. One of the main obstacles lies in the too common 
view of security issues that only addresses them in terms of sovereignty. 
This is another story. 
 
The Power of Narrative 
Whatever the merits of and prospects for successful network "transection" 
of states, there also do appear to be ways to proceed that do not rely on 
the kindness or tolerance of state sponsors.  The global anti-war 
movement, for example, and many other important social networks have 
arisen not from some central design or leadership, but rather in a self-
organizing fashion, very much like that described by Johnson's (2001) 
concept of  "emergence."  Beyond issues of war and peace, mobilization 
of civil society to confront matters of economic equity, health and 
environmental safe ty, and virtually all other issues that have 
transnational characteristics will emerge in this way as long as the 
noosphere is nurtured.   
To grow this "realm of the mind" will require more than just wiring 
everyone together, though.  It will also demand compelling "content" to 
go with the new conduits of information.  And this content will provide 
the burgeoning global network with the narrative dimension that it needs 
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to grow strong.  That is, there must be a "story" that undergirds the 
formation of a global civil society, that persuades masses to join up and 
participate, even to take risks on its behalf.   
In the end, it is the power of the story developed that will be the ultimate 
measure of civil networks' abilities to cope with the many levels and 
types of dislocations wrought by globalization.  Since the start of the 
terror war, it has become apparent that al Qaeda has an exceptionally 
powerful story to tell the members of its network.  Osama bin Laden has 
been able to portray himself and his adherents as sacred warriors devoted 
to eliminating the shadow cast upon the Muslim world by American 
power.  His narrative empowers a terror network.  If they are to flourish, 
civil networks will have to craft equally compelling narratives about 
themselves and the ir purposes.   
Man is the story-telling animal, as much today as countless millennia ago 
when story circles were limited to within earshot of campfires.  And if 
this huge narrative power source has first been tapped in the cause of 
terror, it only reinforces a point that civil society networks must be 
galvanized by their own story.  Their tale will not be of a "clash of 
civilizations," but rather of a fight for the future based on universally 
accepted human rights, and by their vision of a world suffused with 
striving for both liberty and equality.   
If the rise of a networked civil society is sparked by such a narrative, then 
in our view the many dislocations caused by other globalizing processes 
will be sharply curtailed, perhaps even eliminated.  The network 
solutions we seek are thus less about creating more conduits for 
communication and far more about crafting the content that will energize 
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10 Must-Read Books about the "Network Age" 
 
Beyond those works directly cited in this paper, here are some 
accessibly written books that significantly advance understanding of 
the network phenomenon and its potential impact upon the world:  
 
Barabási, Albert-László, Linked:  The New Science of Networks, New 
York:  Perseus Publishing, 2002. 
Brown, John Seely, The Social Life of Information, Boston:  Harvard 
Business School Press, 2000.  
Buchanan, Mark, Nexus:  Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking 
Science of Networks, New York:  Norton, 2002.    
Capra, Fritjof, The Hidden Connections, New York:  Doubleday, 2002. 
Castells, Manuel, The Rise of the Network Society, Malden, MA:  
Blackwell Publishers, 1998.  
Lipnack, Jessica, and Jeffrey Stamps, The Age of the Network, New 
York:  Wiley & Sons, 1994.  
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Structure, Form, and Action, Boston:  Harvard Business School 
Press, 1992.  
Oram, Andy, ed., Peer-to-Peer:  Harnessing the Power of Disruptive 
Technologies, Sebastapol, CA:  O'Reilly & Associates, 2001   
Rheingold, Howard, Smart Mobs:  The Next Social Revoluton, New 
York:  Perseus Publishing, 2002.  
Weinberger, David, Small Pieces Loosely Joined:  A Unified Theory of 
the Web, New York:  Perseus Publishing, 2002. 
 
Appendix B 
Ten Networks That Matter 
 
Direct Action Network.  Network of activist networks. 
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Earth Liberation Front.  Practitioners of eco-terrorism.   
Electronic Frontier Foundation.  ACLU of the Internet.   
Global Exchange.  Activist, human rights, fair trade. 
Green Party.  Political network, nodes in 90 nations. 
Greenpeace.  Environmental and anti-nuclear network. 
Hamas.  Conducts intifada for Palestinian statehood. 
al Qaeda.  Terror network.  At war with U.S. & allies.  
Triads.  Premier crime networks of China, East Asia.   
Yakuza.  Japanese criminal hierarchy/network hybrid.   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
